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1 Introduction
The appropriate response of a central banks interest rate policy to banking crises is
the subject of a continuing and important debate. A standard view is that monetary
policy should play a role only if a nancial disruption directly a¤ects ination or the real
economy; that is, monetary policy should not be used to alleviate nancial distress per
se. Additionally, several studies on interlinkages between monetary policy and nancial-
stability policy recommend the complete separation of the two, citing evidence of higher
and more volatile ination rates in countries where the central bank is in charge of banking
stability.1
Figure 1: The Taylor Rule and the fed funds rate
This view of monetary policy is challenged by observations that, during a banking
crisis, interbank interest rates often appear to be a key instrument used by central banks
1See Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1995) and Di Giorgio and Di Noia (1999).
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for limiting threats to the banking system and interbank markets. During the recent
crisis, which began in August 2007, interest rate setting in both the U.S. and the E.U.
appeared to be geared heavily toward alleviating stress in the banking system and in the
interbank market in particular. Figure 1 shows that the Federal Reserve sharply cut the
fed funds target rate well below the rate prescribed by the Taylor Rule (as measured by the
current output gap and headline CPI ination), which is a primary benchmark for interest
rate policy based on concerns of output and ination. Interest rate policy has been used
similarly in previous nancial disruptions, as Goodfriend (2002) indicates: Consider the
fact that the Fed cut interest rates sharply in response to two of the most serious nancial
crises in recent years: the October 1987 stock market break and the turmoil following
the Russian default in 1998.The practice of reducing interbank rates during nancial
turmoil also challenges the long-debated view originated by Bagehot (1873) that central
banks should provide liquidity to banks at high-penalty interest rates (see Martin 2009,
for example).
We develop a model of the interbank market and show that the central banks interest
rate policy can directly improve liquidity conditions in the interbank lending market
during a nancial crisis. Consistent with central bank practice, the optimal policy in our
model consists of reducing the interbank rate during a crisis. This view implies that the
conventionally supported separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy
should be abandoned.
Intuition for our results can be gained by understanding the role of the interbank
market. The main purpose of this market is to redistribute the xed amount of reserves
that is held within the banking system. In our model, banks may face uncertainty regard-
ing their need for liquid assets, which we associate with reserves. The interbank market
allows banks faced with distributional shocks to redistribute liquid assets among them-
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selves. The interest rate will therefore play a key role in amplifying or reducing the losses
of banks enduring liquidity shocks.
Our model is well suited to think about the tremendous uncertainty and disparity
in liquidity needs among banks during the crisis. Many banks were subject to explicit
and implicit guarantees to provide liquidity funding for asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP) conduits, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and other credit lines. These
banks had potential liquidity risks of needing to pay billions of dollars on a same-day
notice. European banks were especially in need of dollar funds. Many of those banks had
very large funding needs for dollar asset-backed securities, and they had little access to
U.S. domestic dollar deposits. In contrast, other banks received large inows of funds from
nancial investors who were eeing AAA-rated securities, nancial commercial paper, and
money market funds in a ight to liquidity. Many U.S. banks also had access to domestic
retail and commercial dollar deposits.
A key theoretical innovation of our model captures the variation of liquidity needs
that was observed among banks during the crisis. We introduce two di¤erent states of
the world regarding the uncertainty of the distribution of liquidity required by banks.
We associate a state of high uncertainty with a crisis and a state of low uncertainty
with normal times. We also permit the interbank market rate to be state dependent.
According to our model, the central bank should lower the interbank interest rate during
the crisis state to improve the redistribution of liquidity among banks; we also predict
that interbank lending increases as banks redistribute liquidity. Despite widespread claims
that interbank markets froze, the volume of fed funds lending actually increased during
the period that the Federal Reserve cut the fed funds rate, as shown in Figure 1.
A novel result of our model is that there are multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria asso-
ciated with di¤erent pairs of interbank market rates for normal and crisis times. The
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multiplicity of equilibria arises because the demand for and supply of funds in the inter-
bank market are inelastic. This inelasticity is a key feature of our model and corresponds
to the fundamentally inelastic nature of banksshort-term liquidity needs. We show that
the role for the central bank is to determine a unique equilibrium interbank rate and to
select the equilibrium that produces the optimal allocation.
Figure 1 shows the fed funds target rate, which is the announced rate that the Federal
Reserve uses as its instrument for interest rate policy. The gure also shows the e¤ective
fed funds rate, which is the daily average of interest rates on uncollateralized overnight
loans among banks. The gure illustrates that as the Federal Reserve lowered its target
rate during the nancial turmoil, the e¤ective rate was roughly centered around the target
most of the time. Despite brief periods when the e¤ective rate deviated from the target,
the Federal Reserve was generally able to determine the average overnight fed funds rate.
We do not study counterparty risk, which is important for examining credit spreads in
longer term interbank lending. However, credit risk plays a small role relative to liquidity
risk in the overnight market, which is the primary market for banks to handle their short
term liquidity needs.
The interbank interest rate plays two roles in our model. From an ex-ante perspective,
the expected rate is the return from holding liquidity, and it inuences the banksportfolio
decision for holding short-term liquid assets and long-term illiquid assets. Ex post, the rate
determines the terms at which banks can borrow liquid assets in response to distributional
shocks, so that a trade-o¤ is present between the two roles. The optimal allocation can be
achieved only with state-contingent interbank rates. The rate must be low in crisis times
to achieve the e¢ cient redistribution of liquid assets. Yet in order to make low interest
rates during a crisis compatible with the higher return on bankslong-term assets, during
normal times interbank interest rates must be higher than the return on long-term assets
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to induce banks to hold optimal liquidity ex ante. As the conventional separation of
prudential regulation and monetary policy implies that interest rates are set independently
of prudential considerations, our result is a strong criticism of such separation.
Our framework yields several additional results. First, when aggregate liquidity shocks
are considered, we show that the central bank should accommodate the shocks by injecting
or withdrawing liquidity. Interest rates and liquidity injections should be used to address
two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks: Interest rate management allows for coping with
e¢ cient liquidity reallocation in the interbank market, while injections of liquidity allow
for tackling aggregate liquidity shocks. Hence, when interbank markets are modeled as
part of an optimal institutional arrangement, the central bank should respond to di¤erent
types of shocks with di¤erent tools. Second, we show that the failure to implement
a contingent interest rate policy, which will occur if the separation between monetary
policy and prudential regulation prevails, will undermine nancial stability by increasing
the probability of bank runs.
In their seminal study, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) examine banks with idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks from a mechanism design perspective. In their model, when liquid-
ity shocks are not observable, the interbank market is not e¢ cient and the second-best
allocation involves setting a limit on the size of individual loan contracts among banks.
More recent work by Freixas and Holthausen (2005), Freixas and Jorge (2008), and Hei-
der, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2008) examines interbank markets that are not part of an
optimal arrangement. Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2008) make an advancement by develop-
ing a framework in which interbank markets are e¢ cient. The central bank responds to
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks by buying and selling particular quantities of assets,
using its balance sheet to achieve the e¢ cient allocation.
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Building on Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2008), the
modeling innovation in our paper is to introduce a richer state space of multiple distrib-
utional liquidity-shock states. We show that this additional state-space dimension allows
the central bank to address liquidity shocks with an additional tool, namely a dynamic
interest rate policy, which is the standard instrument of central bank policy in practice.
We show that with state-contingent interbank rates, the central bank can achieve the
full-information e¢ cient allocation.
Goodfriend and King (1988) argue that central bank policy should respond to aggre-
gate, but not idiosyncratic, liquidity shocks, because interbank markets are e¢ cient and
can distribute liquidity optimally. We show how central bank policy needs to respond to
shocks in the distribution of liquidity in order for interbank markets to operate e¢ ciently.
The results of our paper also relate to those of Diamond and Rajan (2008), who show that
interbank rates should be low during a crisis and high in normal times. Diamond and Ra-
jan (2008) examine the limits of central bank inuence over bank interest rates based on a
Ricardian equivalence argument, whereas we nd a new mechanism by which the central
bank can adjust interest rates based on the inelasticity of banksshort-term supply of and
demand for liquidity. Our paper also relates to Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2008),
who consider the trade-o¤ faced by nancial intermediaries between holding liquidity ver-
sus acquiring liquidity supplied by a market after shocks occur. E¢ ciency depends on the
timing of central bank intervention in Bolton et al. (2008), whereas in our paper the level
of interest rates is the focus. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) consider interbank markets
with imperfect competition. Gorton and Huang (2006) study interbank liquidity histori-
cally provided by banking coalitions through clearinghouses. Ashcraft, McAndrews, and
Skeie (2008) examine a model of the interbank market with credit and participation fric-
tions that can explain their empirical ndings of reserves hoarding by banks and extreme
6
interbank rate volatility.
Section 2 presents the model of distributional shocks. Section 3 gives the market
results and central bank interest rate policy. Section 4 analyzes aggregate shocks, and
Section 5 examines nancial fragility. Available liquidity is endogenized in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model has three dates, denoted by t = 0; 1; 2, and a continuum of competitive banks,
each with a unit continuum of consumers. Ex-ante identical consumers are endowed with
one unit of good at date 0 and learn their private type at date 1. With a probability  2
(0; 1); a consumer is impatientand needs to consume at date 1. With complementary
probability 1  ; a consumer is patientand needs to consume at date 2. Throughout
the paper, we disregard sunspot-triggered bank runs. At date 0, consumers deposit their
unit good in their bank for a deposit contract that pays an amount when withdrawn at
either date 1 or 2.
There are two possible technologies. The short-term liquid technology, also called
liquid assets, allows for storing goods at date 0 or date 1 for a return of one in the following
period. The long-term investment technology, also called long-term assets, allows for
investing goods at date 0 for a return of r > 1 at date 2: Investment is illiquid and cannot
be liquidated at date 1.2
At date 1, each bank faces stochastic withdrawals that are bank-specic. There is no
aggregate withdrawal risk for the banking system as a whole; on average, each bank has
 withdrawals at date 1.3 We model distributional liquidity shocks by allowing the size
2We extend the model to allow for liquidation at date 1 in Section 6.
3We study a model with distributional and aggregate shocks in Section 4.
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of the bank-specic liquidity shocks to vary with the distributional liquidity-shock state
variable i 2 I  f0; 1g, where
i = f
1 with prob  (crisis state)
0 with prob 1   (normal-times state),
and  2 [0; 1] is the probability of the crisis liquidity-shock state i = 1: We assume that
state i is observable but not veriable, which means that contracts cannot be written
contingent on state i: Banks are ex-ante identical at date 0. At date 1, each bank learns
its private type j 2 J  fh; lg; where
j = f
h with prob 1
2
(high type)
l with prob 1
2
(low type).
In aggregate, half of banks are type h and half are type l. Banks of type j 2 J have a
fraction of impatient depositors at date 1 equal to
ij = f
+ i" for j = h (high withdrawals)
  i" for j = l (low withdrawals),
(1)
where i 2 I and " > 0 is the size of the bank-specic withdrawal shock. We assume that
0 < il  ih < 1 for i 2 I.
To summarize, under the liquidity-shock state i = 1; a crisis occurs and there is a
large distributional shift in liquidity among banks. Banks of type j = h have relatively
high liquidity withdrawals at date 1 and banks of type j = l have relatively low liquidity
withdrawals. Under the liquidity-shock state i = 0; there is no crisis, and the size of the
distributional shift in liquidity is zero. All banks have constant withdrawals of  at date
1. Under either state, at date 2 the remaining depositors withdraw. Banks of type j 2 J
have a fraction of depositor withdrawals equal to 1  ij, i 2 I.
A depositor receives consumption of either c1 for withdrawal at date 1 or c
ij
2 ; an equal




u(c1) with prob  (impatient depositors)
u(cij2 ) with prob 1   (patient depositors),
where u is increasing and concave. We dene c02  c
0j
2 for all j 2 J , since consumption
for impatient depositors of each bank type is equal during normal-times state i = 0: A
depositors expected utility is










Banks maximize prots. Because of competition, they must maximize the expected
utility of their depositors. Banks invest  2 [0; 1] in long-term assets and store 1    in
liquid assets. At date 1, depositors and banks learn their private type. Bank j borrows
f ij 2 R liquid assets on the interbank market (the notation f represents the federal
funds market and f ij < 0 represents a loan made in the interbank market) and impatient
depositors withdraw c1. At date 2, bank j repays the amount f iji for its interbank loan
and the banks remaining depositors withdraw, where i is the interbank interest rate. If
0 6= 1; the interest rate is state contingent, whereas if 0 = 1; the interest rate is not
state contingent. Since banks are able to store liquid assets for a return of one between
dates 1 and 2, banks never lend for a return of less than one, so i  1 for all i 2 I. A
timeline is shown in Figure 2.
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Bank learns type j=h,l,
starts period with 1-α goods,
pays depositorsλijc1,
borrows f ij, stores βij
ιi is the interbank interest
rate in state i
Patient depositors
withdrawc2ij
Bank starts withαr+βij goods,
repays interbank loan f ijιi,
pays depositors (1- λij)c2ij
Figure 2: Timeline
The bank budget constraints for bank j for dates 1 and 2 are
ijc1 = 1    ij + f ij for i 2 I; j 2 J (3)
(1  ij)cij2 = r + ij   f iji for i 2 I; j 2 J ; (4)
respectively, where ij 2 [0; 1 ] is the amount of liquid assets that banks of type j store
between dates 1 and 2. We assume that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for u(c) is
greater than one, which implies that banks provide risk-decreasing liquidity insurance. We
also assume that banks lend liquid assets when indi¤erent between lending and storing.
We only consider parameters such that there are no bank defaults in equilibrium.4 As
such, we assume that incentive compatibility holds:
cij2  c1 for all i 2 I; j 2 J ;
which rules out bank runs based on very large bank liquidity shocks.
The bank optimizes over ; c1; fcij2 ; ij; f ijgi2I; j2J to maximize its depositorsex-
pected utility. From the date 1 budget constraint (3), we can solve for the quantity of
4Bank defaults and insolvencies that cause bank runs are considered in Section 5.
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interbank borrowing by bank j as
f ij(; c1; 
ij) = ijc1   (1  ) + ij for i 2 I; j 2 J : (5)
Substituting this expression for f ij into the date 2 budget constraint (4) and rearranging
gives consumption by patient depositors as
cij2 (; c1; 
ij) =
r + ij   [ijc1   (1  ) + ij]i
(1  ij)
: (6)




s.t. ij  1   for i 2 I; j 2 J (8)
cij2 (; c1; 
ij) = r+
ij [ijc1 (1 )+ij ]i
(1 ij) for i 2 I; j 2 J , (9)
where constraint (8) gives the maximum amount of liquid assets that can be stored be-
tween dates 1 and 2.
The clearing condition for the interbank market is
f ih =  f il for i 2 I: (10)
An equilibrium consists of contingent interbank market interest rates and an allocation
such that banks maximize prots, consumers make their withdrawal decisions to maximize
their expected utility, and the interbank market clears.
3 Results and interest rate policy
In this section, we derive the optimal allocation and characterize equilibrium allocations.
We start by showing that the optimal allocation is independent of the liquidity-shock
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state i 2 I and bank types j 2 J . Next, we derive the Euler and no-arbitrage conditions.
After that, we study the special cases in which a crisis never occurswhen  = 0 and
in which a crisis always occurswhen  = 1. This allows us to build intuition for the
general case where  2 [0; 1]:
3.1 First best allocation
To nd the full-information rst best allocation, we consider a planner who can observe
consumer types. The planner can ignore the liquidity-shock state i, bank type j; and bank
liquidity withdrawal shocks ij: The planner maximizes the expected utility of depositors








s.t. c1  1     
1  

c2  r + 1  +    c1
  1  :
The constraints are the physical quantities of goods available for consumption at date 1
and 2, and available storage between dates 1 and 2, respectively. The rst-order conditions
and binding constraints give the well-known rst best allocations, denoted with asterisks,
as implicitly dened by
u0(c1) = ru
0(c2) (11)





 = 0: (14)
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Equation (11) shows that the ratio of marginal utilities between dates 1 and 2 is equal to
the marginal return on investment r:
3.2 First-order conditions
Next, we consider the optimization problem of a bank of type j given by equations (7) -
(9) in order to nd the Euler and no-arbitrage pricing equations.





E[iu0(cij2 )] = rE[u
0(cij2 )]; (16)
Banks do not store liquid assets from date 1 to date 2:
ij = 0 for all i 2 I; j 2 J : (17)
Proof. The Lagrange multiplier for constraint (8) is ij : The rst-order condition with
respect to ij is
1
2
u0(c1j2 )(1  1)  
1j
 for j 2 J (= if 
1j > 0) (18)
(1  )u0(c02)(1  0)  
0j
 for j 2 J (= if 
0j > 0): (19)
We rst will show that ij = 0 for all i 2 I; j 2 J . Suppose not, that 
bibj
 > 0 for somebi 2 I, bj 2 J . This implies that equation (18) or (19) corresponding to bi;bj does not bind
(since i  1); which implies that bibj = 0: Hence, equation (8) does not bind (since clearly
 < 1; otherwise c1 = 0); thus, 
bibj
 = 0 by complementary slackness, a contradiction.
Taking the rst order conditions of equations (7) - (9) with respect to c1 and ; and
substituting for ij = 0 for i 2 I; j 2 J gives equations (15) and (16), respectively.
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Next, suppose ij > 0 for some i 2 I, j 2 J : Substituting from the interbank
borrowing demand equation (5) into the market clearing condition (10) and simplifying
shows that total bank storage at date 1 in state  = 0 and  = 1 must be equal:
0h + 0l = 2(1    c1)
1h + 1l = 2(1    c1):
Since ij  0; 0j > 0 for some j 2 J if and only if 1j0 > 0 for some j0 2 J . Conditions
(18) and (19) imply that 0 = 1 = 1; which implies by condition (16) that r = 1; a
contradiction. Hence, ij = 0 for all i 2 I, j 2 J . 
Equation (15) is the Euler equation and determines the investment level  given i for
i 2 I: Equation (16), which corresponds to the rst-order condition with respect to ; is
the no-arbitrage pricing condition for the rate i, which states that the expected marginal
utility-weighted returns on storage and investment must be equal at date t = 0. The
return on investment is r: The return on storage is the rate i at which liquid assets can
be lent at date 1, since banks can store liquid assets at date 0, lend them at date 1, and
will receive i at date 2. At the interest rates 1 and 0; banks are indi¤erent to holding
liquid assets and long-term assets at date 0 according to the no-arbitrage condition.
The interbank market-clearing condition (10), together with the interbank market
demand equation (5), determines cj1() and f





f ij() = (1  )(
ij

  1) for i 2 I; j 2 J (21)
= f
i"c1 for i 2 I, j = h
 i"c1 for i 2 I, j = l:
Since no liquid assets are stored between dates 1 and 2 for state i = 0; 1, patient depos-
itorsconsumption c02 in state i = 0 equals the average of patient depositorsconsumption
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cij2 in state i = 1 and equals total investment returns r divided by the mass of impatient
depositors 1  :
c02() =






The choice of  is given in the next subsections, where the full equilibrium results are
derived.
3.3 Single liquidity-shock state:  2 f0; 1g
We start by nding solutions to the special cases of  2 f0; 1g in which there is certainty
about the single state of the world i at date 1. These are particularly interesting bench-
marks. In the case of  = 0; the state i = 0 is always realized. This case corresponds
to the standard framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and can be interpreted as a
crisis never occurring. In the case of  = 1; the state i = 1 is always realized. This
corresponds to the case studied by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and can be interpreted
as a crisis always occurring. These boundary cases will then help to solve the general
model  2 [0; 1].
With only a single possible state of the world at date 1, it is easy to show that the
interbank rate must equal the return on long-term assets. First-order conditions (15) and





















u0(c1l2 )]r + (1  )u0(c02)r: (24)
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As is intuitive, for  = 0; the value of 1 is indeterminate, and for  = 1; the value of 0 is
indeterminate. In either case, there is an equilibrium with a unique allocation c1; c
ij
2 ; and
. The indeterminate variable is of no consequence for the allocation. The allocation is
determined by the two rst-order equations, in the two unknowns  and 0 (for  = 0) or
1 (for  = 1). Equation (24) shows that the interbank lending rate equals the return on
long-term assets: 0 = r (for  = 0) or 1 = r (for  = 1):With a single state of the world,
the interbank lending rate must equal the return on long-term assets.
For  = 0; the crisis state never occurs. There is no need for banks to borrow on the
interbank market. The banksbudget constraints imply that in equilibrium no interbank
lending occurs, f 0j = 0 for j 2 J . However, the interbank lending rate 0 still plays the
role of clearing markets: It is the lending rate at which each banks excess demand is
zero, which requires that the returns on liquidity and investment are equal. The result is
0 = r; which is an important market price that ensures banks hold optimal liquidity. Our
result that the banksportfolio decision is a¤ected by a market price at which there is
no trading is similar to the e¤ect of prices with no trading in equilibrium in standard
portfolio theory and asset pricing with a representative agent. The Euler equation (23)
is equivalent to equation (11) for the planner. Banks choose the optimal  and provide
the rst best allocation c1 and c

2:
Proposition 1. For  = 0; the equilibrium is characterized by 0 = r and has a unique




Proof. For  = 0; equation (24) implies 0 = r: Equation (23) simplies to u0(c1) =






results are equivalent to the planners results in equations (11) through (13), implying




2; and  = 
: 
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To interpret these results, note that banks provide liquidity at date 1 to impatient
depositors by paying c1 > 1: This can be accomplished only by paying c

2 < r on with-
drawals to patient depositors at date 2. The key for the bank being able to provide
liquidity insurance to impatient depositors is that the bank can pay an implicit date 1




; which is less than the interbank




< 0 = r: This contract is optimal because the




We now turn to the symmetric case of  = 1; where the crisis state i = 1 always
occurs. We show that, in this case, the optimal allocation cannot be obtained, even
though interbank lending provides redistribution of liquidity. Nevertheless, because the
interbank rate is high, 1 = r, patient depositors face ine¢ cient consumption risk, and
the liquidity provided to impatient depositors is reduced. The banksborrowing demand
from equation (21) shows that f 1h = "c1 and f 1l =  "c1.
First, consider the outcome at date 1 holding xed  = . With 1 = r; patient
depositors do not have optimal consumption since c1h2 (
) < c2 < c
1l
2 (
): A bank of type





Second, consider the determination of : Banks must compensate patient depositors
for the risk they face. They can do so by increasing their expected consumption. Hence,
in equilibrium, investment is  >  and impatient depositors see a decease of their
consumption. The results are illustrated in Figure 3. The di¤erence of consumption c02 for
equilibrium  compared to c2(
); c1h2 (
); and c1l2 () for a xed  = 
 is demonstrated













For any " > 0 shock, banks do not provide the optimal allocation.
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Figure 3: First best allocation and equilibrium allocation for  = 1











Proof. For  = 1; equation (24) implies 1 = r: By equation (6), c1l2 > c
1h
2 : From the
































u0(c1l2 ) > u
0(c02) since 






















Since u0(c1()) is increasing in  and u0(c
1j
2 ()) for j 2 J is decreasing in ; the Euler















Notice that, for  = 1, the di¤erence between our approach and that of Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987) is that in our framework the market cannot impose any restriction on the
size of the trades. This forces the interbank market to equal r and creates an ine¢ ciency.
The mechanism design approach of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) yields a second best
allocation that achieves higher welfare, but in that case the market cannot be anonymous
anymore, as the size of the trade has to be observed and enforced.
3.4 Multiple liquidity-shock states:  2 [0; 1]
We now apply our results for the special cases  2 f0; 1g to the general case  2 [0; 1]: It
is convenient to dene an ex-post equilibrium, which refers to the interest rate that clears
the interbank market in state i at date 1, conditional on a given  and c1: For distinction,
we use the term ex-ante equilibrium to refer to our equilibrium concept used above from
the perspective of date 0. We rst show that the supply and demand in the interbank
market are inelastic, which creates an indeterminacy of the ex-post equilibrium interest
rate. Next, we show that there is a real indeterminacy of the ex-ante equilibrium. There
is a continuum of Pareto-ranked ex-ante equilibria with di¤erent values for c1; c
ij
2 ; and .
We rst show the indeterminacy of the ex-post equilibrium interest rate. In state
i = 1; the amount of liquid assets that bank type l supplies in the interbank market is
 f 1l(1) = f
"c1 for 1  1
0 for 1 < 1:
(25)
The liquid bank has an inelastic supply of liquid assets above a rate of one because its
alternative to lending is storage, which gives a return of one. Bank type h has a demand
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for liquid assets of
f 1h(1) = f









1 for 1 < 1:
(26)
The maximum rate 1 at which the illiquid bank type j can borrow, such that the incentive
constraint c1h2  c1 holds and patient depositors do not withdraw at date 1, is 1 +
(1 )(c02 c1)
"c1
. The illiquid bank has an inelastic demand for liquid assets below the rate 1
because its alternative to borrowing is to default on withdrawals to impatient depositors
at date 1. The bankssupply and demand curves for date 1 are illustrated in Figure 4.
In state i = 0; each bank has an inelastic net demand for liquid assets of
f 0j(0) = f
0 for 0  1
1 for 0 < 1:
(27)
At a rate of 0 > 1; banks do not have any liquid assets they can lend in the market.
All such assets are needed to cover the withdrawals of impatient depositors. At a rate of








Figure 4: Interbank market in state i = 1
20
Lemma 2. The ex-post equilibrium rate i in state i; for i 2 I, is indeterminate:
0  1





Proof. Substituting for f 0j(0) from (27), for j 2 J , into market-clearing condition (10)
and solving gives the condition for the equilibrium rate 0: Substituting for f 1l(1) and
f 1h(l) from (25) and (26) into market-clearing condition (10) and solving gives the cor-
responding condition for the equilibrium rate 1: 
This result highlights a key feature of our model: The supply and demand of short-term
liquidity are fundamentally inelastic. By the nature of short-term nancing, distributional
liquidity shocks imply that liquidity held in excess of immediate needs is of low fundamen-
tal value to the bank that holds it, while demand for liquidity for immediate needs is of
high fundamental value to the bank that requires it to prevent default. The interest rate
i determines how gains from trade are shared ex-post among banks. Low rates benet
illiquid banks and their claimants, and decrease impatient depositorsconsumption risk,
which increases ex-ante expected utility for all depositors.
Next, we show that there exists a continuum of Pareto-ranked ex-ante equilibria.
Finding an equilibrium amounts to solving the two rst-order conditions, equations (15)
and (16), in three unknowns, ; 1; and 0: This is a key di¤erence with respect to the
benchmark cases of  = 0; 1: For each of these cases, there is only one state that occurs
with positive probability, and the corresponding state interest rate is the only ex-post
equilibrium rate that is relevant. Hence, there are two relevant variables,  and i; where
i is the relevant state, that are uniquely determined by the two rst-order conditions.
In the general two-states model, a bank faces a distribution of probabilities over two
interest rates. A continuum of pairs (1; 0) supports an ex-ante equilibrium. This result
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is novel in showing that, when there are two distributional liquidity states i at date 1,
there exists a continuum of ex-ante equilibria.5 Allen and Gale (2004) also show that
a continuum of interbank rates can support an ex-post sunspot equilibrium. However,
because they consider a model with a single state, the only rate that supports an ex-ante
equilibrium is r, similar to our benchmark case of  = 1.
If the interbank rate is not state contingent, 1 = 0 = r is the unique equilibrium,
as is clear from equation (24). The allocation resembles a weighted average of the cases
 2 f0; 1g and is suboptimal, showing an important drawback of the separation between
prudential regulation and monetary policy. In the case where 1 = 0 = r; equation (23)
implies that (), c02(); c
1h
2 (); and c
1l
2 () are implicit functions of . The cases of  = 0
and  = 1 provide bounds for the general case of  2 [0; 1]: Equilibrium consumption
c1() and c
ij
2 () for i 2 I; j 2 J ; written as functions of , are displayed in Figure 5. This
gure shows that c1() is decreasing in  while c
ij
2 () is increasing in :
cij2 (0)  c
ij
2 ()  c
ij
2 (1) for  2 [0; 1]; i 2 I; j 2 J
c1(1)  c1()  c1(0) for  2 [0; 1]:
In addition,
c02( = 0) = c

2 for j 2 J
c1( = 0) = c

1
c1j2 ( = 0) = c
1j
2 ( = 
) for j 2 J :
With interbank rates equal to r in all states, patient depositors face too much risk. To
compensate them for this risk, their expected consumption must be increased to the
detriment of impatient depositors.
5The results from this section generalize in a straightforward way to the case of N states, as shown
in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium allocation for  2 [0; 1]
Finally, we show that there exists a rst best ex-ante equilibrium with state contingent








To show this, rst we substitute for 1; ij; c1; and 
ij from equations (28), (1), (20), and







This shows that, with 1 equal to the optimal intertemporal return on deposits between
dates 1 and 2, there is optimal risk-sharing of the goods that are available at date 2. This
implies that the interbank market rate has to be low for patient depositors to face no
risk. Substituting for 1; c1j2 ; and c
0
2 from equations (28), (29), and (22), respectively, into
equation (24) and rearranging gives the interest rate in state i = 0:






1   ; (30)
and further substituting for these variables into equation (23) and rearranging gives
u0(c1) = r
0u0(c02): This is the planners condition and implies  = 







a rst best allocation.
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Substituting these equilibrium values into equation (30) and simplifying shows that
0 = 0






1   > r: (31)
The market rate 0 must be greater than r during the no-shock state, in order for the
expected rate to equal r; such that banks are indi¤erent to holding liquid assets and
investing at date 0. Equation (16) implies, then, that the expected market rate is E[i] = r:





the suboptimal equilibrium (with 1 = 0 = r): Arrows indicate the change in consumption
between the suboptimal and the rst best equilibria.






Figure 6: Di¤erence between equilibrium allocation and rst best allocation for  2 [0; 1]
Proposition 3. For  2 (0; 1); there exists a continuum of ex-ante equilibria with di¤er-
ent Pareto-ranked allocations. In particular, there exists a suboptimal ex-ante equilibrium
with






























2 for i 2 I; j 2 J :
3.5 Central bank interest rate policy
The result of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and a need for a state-contingent interest
rate in our model suggest a role for an institution that can select the best equilibrium.
Since equilibria can be distinguished by the interest rate in the interbank market, a
central bank is the natural candidate for this role. A central bank can select the optimal
equilibrium and intervene by targeting the optimal market interest rate. We think of the
interest rate i at which banks lend in the interbank market as the unsecured interest rate
that many central banks target for monetary policy. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve
targets the overnight interest rate, also known as the federal funds rate.
We extend the model by adding a central bank that can o¤er to borrow an amount
 > 0 below i and lend an amount  > 0 above i on the interbank market in order
to target the interbank rate equal to i. The central banks objective is to maximize the
depositors expected utility equation (2), subject to the banks optimization equations (7)
through (9), by submitting the following demand and supply functions, respectively, for
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the interbank market:
f iD(i) = f
0 for i  i; i 2 I
 for i < i i 2 I
(32)
f iS(i) = f
  for i > i; i 2 I
0 for i  i; i 2 I;
(33)
for any  > 0: The goods-clearing condition for the interbank market (10) is replaced by
f ih(i) + f iD(i) =  [f il(i) + f iS(i)] for i 2 I. (34)
Substituting for the supply and demand functions, the market-clearing condition (34) can
be written as
i"c1 + 1i<i = i"c1 + 1i>i for i 2 I;
which, for any  > 0; holds for the unique state i ex-post equilibrium rate i = i, for i 2
I. The ex-post equilibrium rate in state i = 1 is shown in Figure 7. The gure illustrates
how the central bank shifts the market supply and demand curves such that there is a
unique equilibrium at 1: At i; the equilibrium quantity that clears the market according
to condition (34) is i"c1: The quantity ; with which the central bank intervenes out of
equilibrium, is irrelevant. The state-conditional equilibrium rate is uniquely determined




f1h(ι1) + f 1D(ι1)
ι¹
1
- [f 1l(ι1) + f 1S(ι1)]
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Figure 7: Interbank market in state i = 1 with optimal central
bank interest rate policy
Proposition 4. Under optimal central bank interest rate policy, the central bank sets
1 = 1 < r and 0 = 0 > r: There exists a unique ex-ante equilibrium, which has a rst
best allocation ; c1; c

2:
This proposition provides the main policy result of our model. Several things are
worth noting. First, the central bank should respond to pure distributional liquidity
shocks, i.e., involving no aggregate-withdrawal liquidity shocks, by lowering the interbank
rate. Second, the central bank must keep the interbank rate su¢ ciently high in normal
times to provide banks with incentives to invest enough in liquid assets. Third, the policy
rule should be announced in advance so that banks can anticipate the central banks
state-contingent actions.
All of our results hold in a version of our model where bank deposit contracts are
expressed in nominal terms and at money is borrowed and lent at nominal rates in
the interbank market, along the lines of Skeie (2008) and Martin (2006). In the nominal
version of the model, the central bank targets the real interbank rate by o¤ering to borrow
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and lend at a nominal rate in at central bank reserves rather than goods (see Appendix
B in Freixas, Martin, and Skeie (2009)). This type of policy resembles more closely the
standard tools used by central banks.
3.6 Discussion and evidence
A key feature of our model is the inelasticity of bankssupply and demand for liquidity,
which leads to the multiplicity of market clearing interbank rates absent central bank
intervention. There are several pieces of evidence suggesting that in practice, banks may
have inelastic supply and demand for reserves, and interbank rates may be indeterminate.
Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2008) give empirical evidence of the inelasticity of
supply and demand for bank reserves. They also show theoretical support to explain the
inelasticity of supply and demand for bank reserves during the crisis before the interest-
on-reserves regime was implemented on October 9, 2008. In the absence of bank reserve
requirements, the marginal return on bank reserves held overnight must equal either zero
or the shadow cost of borrowing reserves from the discount window. The reason is that
if a bank has a positive supply of reserves (i.e. a long position), the overnight return
on marginal reserves held in reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve is zero. If instead
the bank has a negative supply of reserves (i.e. a short position), then the bank has an
overdraft with the Federal Reserve. The bank must cover this overdraft by borrowing
at the discount window at a cost of the discount rate plus any potential stigma cost of
accessing the discount window. Many times throughout the crisis, reserve requirements
were not binding, which would imply that banks e¤ectively had inelastic supply and
demand for reserves.
Figure 8 shows the daily intraday high-low range of interest rates at which fed funds
lending occurred during the crisis. The e¤ective fed funds rate was typically close to
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the target, which shows that the Federal Reserve could generally determine the average
daily rate with the daily open market operations (o¤ering to borrow or lend reserves) that
the Federal Reserve scheduled each morning. However, the fed funds market trades all
throughout the day. During the afternoon when the Federal Reserve was not intervening
in the market, the fed funds rate often traded over the course of a few hours at extremely
di¤erent rates in a range of several hundred basis points from nearly zero to above the
discount rate. This evidence is consistent with bankshaving very inelastic supply and
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Figure 8: Fed funds rate and intraday range
Further evidence that the interbank market can clear at any of a range of interest rates
chosen by the central bank without requiring actual liquidity intervention is suggested by
the appearance of open mouth operations.This term refers to the broadly recognized
ability of many central banks to adjust short-term market rates by announcing their
intended rate target, without any trading or lending by the central bank in equilibrium.
Guthrie and Wright (2000) describe monetary policy implementation in New Zealand as
working through open mouth operations. Open mouth operations have also been used to
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describe how the Federal Reserve changes the level of reserves in the banking system only
very slightly to e¤ect interest rate changes after the target change has been announced.
Often, the fed funds rate changes in anticipation of the announcement of a change in the
target rate in advance of any intervention by the Federal Reserve. In our model, zero
trading is required by the central bank in equilibrium, and the amount  of borrowing
and lending o¤ered by the central bank approaches zero in the limit.
Other examples of highly inelastic bank supply and demand for reserves comes from
countries with low aggregate bank reserves and wide interest rate corridors (or channels).
These corridors are methods of monetary policy implementation that have been used in
Canada, New Zealand, the ECB, the UK, and other countries. A corridor consists of
standing facilities at which banks can lend or borrow reserves at the central bank on a
daily basis at the corridor deposit or lending rates, respectively. Whitesell (2006) shows
that with a very small amount of reserves in the banking system, banks have very inelastic
supply and demand for reserves in the interbank market for reasons similar to the analysis
of the fed funds market by Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2008) as described above.
In our model, the central bank supply and demand curves resemble a corridor system of
zero width.
In Section 6 below, we examine the robustness of a banks inelastic demand when a
bank has options for liquidation of its assets outside of borrowing on the interbank market.
The possibility of liquidation of investment may restrict the set of feasible real interbank
rates and may preclude the central bank from selecting the rst best equilibrium with
interest rate policy. We show that interbank market rates that are larger than the return
on liquidation are not feasible. However, even with outside liquidity options, the general
principle of the model holds. Inelastic supply and demand for liquidity within a range of
interest rates implies that there can be some indeterminacy of market clearing interest
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rates, and the central bank can implement the constrained e¢ cient rates among them.
4 Aggregate shocks and central bank liquidity injec-
tions
The standard view on aggregate liquidity shocks is that they should be dealt with through
open market operations, as advocated by Goodfriend and King (1988), for example. Since
our framework provides micro-foundations for the interbank market, and this has conse-
quences for the overall allocation, it is worth revisiting the issue of aggregate liquidity
shocks. Despite the apparent complexity, we verify that the central bank should use a
liquidity injection policy in the face of aggregate shocks. Thus, the central bank should
respond to di¤erent kinds of shocks with di¤erent policy instruments: liquidity injection
to deal with aggregate liquidity shocks and interest rate policy for distributional liquidity
shocks.
We extend the model to allow the probability of a depositor being impatient and,
hence, the aggregate fraction of impatient depositors in the economy to be stochastic.
This probability is denoted by a; where a 2 A  fH;Lg is the aggregate-shock state,
a = f
H with prob 
L with prob 1  ;
and  2 [0; 1]: The state a = H denotes a high aggregate-withdrawal liquidity shock,
in which a high fraction of depositors are impatient, and state a = L denotes a low
aggregate-withdrawal liquidity shock, in which a low fraction of depositors are impatient.
We assume that H  L and H + (1  )L = : Hence,  remains the unconditional
fraction of impatient depositors. The aggregate-withdrawal state random variable a is
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independent of the distributional-state variable i:6 We assume that the central bank can
tax the endowment of agents at date 0, store these goods, and return the taxes at date 1
or at date 2. We denote these transfers, which can be conditional on the aggregate shock,
 0,  1a,  2a, a 2 A, respectively.
The depositors expected utility (2) is replaced by
E[U ] =


















(1  1hL )u(c1h2L) + (1  1lL )u(c1l2L)

;
and the banks budget constraints (3) and (4) are replaced by
ija c1 = 1   0     ija + f ija +  1a; for a 2 A; i 2 I; j 2 J
(1  ija )c
ij
a2 = r + 
ij
a   f ija ia +  2a; for a 2 A; i 2 I; j 2 J ;




a ; and 
i
a denotes that these
variables are conditional on a 2 A in addition to i 2 I and j 2 J .
The planners optimization with aggregate shocks is identical to the problem described
in Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2008). They show that there exists a unique solution to this
problem. Intuitively, the rst best with aggregate shocks is constructed as follows. The
planner stores just enough goods to provide consumption to all impatient agents in the
state with many impatient agents, a = H. This implicitly denes c1. In this state, patient
6We refer to a as the aggregate state variable(or alternatively as the aggregate-shock state variable)
in order to highlight that this state variable corresponds to the amount of the aggregate withdrawal of
liquidity from the banking system. While the state variable i does correspond to an aggregate state of
the world (crisis or normal-times), we refer to i as the distributional-state variable (or liquidity-shock
state variable).
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agents consume only goods invested in the long-term technology. In the state with few
impatient agents, a = L; the planner stores (H L)c1 goods in excess of what is needed
for impatient agents. These goods are stored between dates 1 and 2 and given to patient
agents.
Proposition 5. If  < 1, the central bank can implement the rst best allocation.
Proof. We prove this proposition by constructing the allocation the central bank imple-




H + (1  )L
iau
0(cija2)]; for a 2 A; i 2 I; j 2 J (35)
E[iau
0(cija2)] = rE[u
0(cija2)]; for a 2 A; i 2 I; j 2 J : (36)
Assume that the amount of stored goods that the central bank taxes is  0 = (H  
L)c1. Consider the economy with large distributional shocks, i = 1: If there are many
impatient depositors, the banks do not have enough stored goods, on aggregate, for these
depositors. However, the central bank can return the taxes at date 1, setting  1H =
(H   L)c1 (and  2H = 0), so that banks have just enough stored goods on aggregate.
The interbank market interest rate is indeterminate, since the supply and demand of










Now consider the economy in the case where i = 0. If there are many impatient
depositors, the banks will not have enough stored goods for their them. However, as
in the previous case, the central bank can return the taxes at date 1, setting  1H =
(H  L)c1 (and  2H = 0), so that banks have enough stored goods. There is no activity
in the interbank market, and the interbank market rate is indeterminate. If there are few
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impatient depositors and the central bank sets  1L = 0 (with  2L = (H   L)c1), then
banks have just enough goods for their impatient depositors at date 1. Again, there is no
activity in the interbank market, and the interbank market rate is indeterminate. Hence,
the interbank market rate can be chosen to make sure that equation (36) holds.
With interbank market rates set in that way, banks will choose the optimal investment.
Indeed, since equation (36) holds, banks are willing to invest in both storage and the long-
term technology. In states where there is a zero distributional shock, there is no interbank
market lending, so any deviation from the optimal investment carries a cost. In states
where there is a positive distributional shock, the rate on the interbank market is such
that the expected utility of a banks depositors cannot be higher than under the rst
best allocation, so there is no benet from deviating from the optimal investment in these
states. 
The interest rate policy of the central bank is e¤ective only if the inelastic parts of
the supply and demand curves overlap. With aggregate liquidity shocks, this need not
happen, which creates ine¢ ciencies. Proposition 5 illustrates that the role of the liquidity
injection policy is to modify the amount of liquid assets in the market so that the interest
rate policy can be e¤ective. Hence, the central bank uses di¤erent tools to deal with
aggregate and distributional shocks. When an aggregate shock occurs, the central bank
needs to inject liquidity in the form of stored goods. In contrast, when an distributional
shock occurs, the central bank needs to lower interest rates. Both actions are necessary
if both shocks occur simultaneously.
During the recent crisis, certain central banks have used tools that have been charac-
terized as similar to scal policy. This is consistent with our model in that the central
bank policy of taxing and redistributing goods in the case of aggregate shocks resembles
scal policy. The model does not imply that the central bank should be the preferred
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institution to implement this kind of policy. For example, we could assume that di¤erent
institutions are in charge of 1) setting the interbank rate, and 2) choosing  0,  1a,  2a,
a 2 A. Regardless of the choice of institutions, our model suggests that implementing
a good allocation may require using tools that resemble scal policy in conjunction with
more standard central bank tools.
In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has conducted several operations during the crisis that
are broader than traditional monetary policy tools to provide aggregate liquidity. Under
the Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program, the Federal Reserve
is purchasing $1.25 trillion of agency MBS. The Federal Reserve nanced large asset pur-
chases involving Bear Stearns and AIG. The Federal Reserve has extended funding for
various securities, markets and institutions beyond the traditional scope of Open Market
Operations and the Discount Window through the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF), the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Fa-
cility (AMLF), and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), and the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). The CPFF targeted funding for issuers
of commercial paper, while the AMLF and MMIFF targeted funding for money market
funds to help against redemption requests, and the TALF provided funding to support
the issuance of asset-backed securities targeted towards credit needs for households and
small businesses. In these transactions, the Federal Reserve has taken potential interest
rate and credit risk, which theoretically could lead to losses that are borne by taxpayers
through reduced revenues delivered to the Treasury by the Federal Reserve.
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5 Contingent interest rate setting and nancial sta-
bility
Our model allows us to shed light on the role of the interbank market in coping with
distributional liquidity shocks and the impact of interest rates on the ex-post redistrib-
ution of risks. In our framework, a contingent interest-rate-setting policy dominates a
noncontingent one. This is a strong criticism of the conventional view supporting the
separation of prudential regulation and monetary policy. We now proceed to compare
contingent and noncontingent interest rate policy in terms of nancial stability. We show
that fundamental bank runs can occur for a noncontingent interest-rate-setting policy,
whereas they cannot arise when a contingent interest rate setting is implemented. Thus,
contingent interest-rate-setting policy, and the rejection of separation between prudential
and monetary policies, fares better also in terms of nancial stability.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that the probability of an aggregate liquidity
shock is zero, such that the fraction of impatient depositors is always ; as in the basic
distributional-shock model of Section 3. We now consider a wider range of parameters. We
no longer require that cij2 > c1; we now consider any parameters such that c
ij
2 > 0. This
allows us to consider fundamental bank runs, which we dene as occurring to bank j in
state i if cij2 < c1: In this case, each impatient consumer prefers to withdraw at date 1 even
if all other consumers withdraw at date 2. The origin of possible fundamental bank runs
is that, in the state where i = 1, patient depositors of banks with many impatient agents




: If " is large, it
may be the case that the consumption of patient depositors of banks with many impatient
agents would be lower if they withdraw at date 2 than if they withdraw at date 1, which
would trigger a bank run. Obviously, if the optimal contingent interest-rate-setting policy
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; fundamental bank runs are ruled out.
Proposition 6. If   1=2 and the central bank chooses to implement a noncontingent
interest rate policy, for  su¢ ciently low there exist " su¢ ciently large such that bank
runs will occur in equilibrium.




: For i > 1; i 2 I; the
rst-order conditions of the banks optimization with respect to ij; equations (18) and
(19), do not bind, implying ij = 0 for i 2 I; j 2 J : As  converges to 0; by continuity,












1  . A fundamental bank run will occur in state i = 1 if and
only if c1h2 < c1: This is equivalent to
r [  "c1] < (1    ")c1;












r   1 :
Recall that 0  ij  1 implies "  minf; 1   g. If   1
2
; then this condition
becomes "  1   : The condition on parameters such that cij2 > 0 requires " < c1 ;
which is su¢ cient to ensure "  1    since  = 1   c1 and c1 > 1: So, bank runs
37









); which is a non-empty interval. Thus, there exist " for
which bank runs will occur. Now, since bank runs are anticipated, banks could choose
a run preventingdeposit contract, as suggested by Cooper and Ross (1998). However,
following the argument in that paper, banks will not choose a run-preventing deposit
contract if the probability of a bank run is su¢ ciently small. So for  su¢ ciently close to
zero, there exist " for which bank runs will occur in equilibrium. 
6 Liquidation of the long-term technology
We endogenize the amount of liquid assets available in the interbank market at date 1
by extending the model to allow for premature liquidation of the investment. Allowing
for liquidation also allows us to examine the robustness of the central banks interest rate
policy to banksoptions outside of borrowing on the interbank market. Banks in need of
liquidity may choose to liquidate investment if the interbank rate is too high. This can
restrict the set of feasible real interbank rates and may preclude the rst best equilibrium.
Indeed, as banks have the alternative option of liquidating their assets, interbank market
rates that are larger than the return on liquidation are not feasible, and this might restrict
the central banks policy options.
Again, to simplify the exposition, we assume that the fraction of impatient depositors
is always . At date 1, bank j can liquidate ij of the investment for a salvage rate of
return s at date 1 and no further return at date 2. The bank budget constraints (3) and
(4) are replaced by
ijc1 = 1    ij + ijs+ f ij for i 2 I; j 2 J (37)
(1  ij)cij2 = (  ij)r + ij   f iji for i 2 I; j 2 J ; (38)
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s.t. ij  1   for i 2 I; j 2 J
ij   for i 2 I; j 2 J
equations (37) and (38).
The ability for banks to liquidate long-term assets for liquid assets and lend them on the
interbank market restricts the ex-post equilibrium interest rate from being too high. This
is the case because, for any state i; the ex-post equilibrium rate is restricted by i  r
s
.
Indeed, for i > r
s
banks would prefer to liquidate all investment and no banks would
borrow. Consequently, the optimal equilibrium cannot be supported if the rate required
to support the rst best ex-ante equilibrium in state i = 0 is too high. Proposition 7 gives
a more precise statement:









; the rst best cannot be achieved as a contingent
interest-rate-setting market equilibrium.
Proof. If 0 > r
s
; then the equilibrium rate is 0 < r
s
< 0; it is less than the equilibrium
rate required to support a rst best equilibrium. 
If the probability of a crisis is low enough, then the rst best equilibrium is always
feasible. The limit of 0 as   ! 0 is r: Moreover, for small ; 0 has to be only slightly
greater than r for the interest rate in expectation to equal r; because the probability of
the rate being low during a crisis is small. This result is expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. For any s  1; there exists a b > 0 such that for all  2 (0;b); 0 < r
s
and the rst best ex-ante equilibrium exists.
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()  < b: 
It is interesting to emphasize that, as s stands for salvage value of the investment, it
can be interpreted as the liquidity of a market for the long-run technology. From that
perspective, our result states that the higher the liquidity of the market for the long-term
technology, the lower the ex-ante e¢ ciency of the banking system. Our result is surprising
in the context of central bank policy, but it is quite natural in the context of Diamond-
Dybvig models, where the trading of deposits destroys the liquidity insurance function of
banks.
7 Conclusion
The Federal Reserve drastically lowered the fed funds rate during the recent banking crisis.
The insights of our model explain the benets of low rates for the e¢ cient redistribution
of liquidity in the interbank market.
Our paper provides micro-foundations for the interbank market role in allocating liq-
uidity, which is important in order to understand how central banks should respond to
liquidity shocks. Two types of liquidity shocks are considered: distributional shocks and
aggregate shocks. The main insight is that, because of the inelasticity of the short-term
market for the liquid asset, the central bank can pick an optimal equilibrium from a set of
equilibria by setting the interest rate in the interbank market appropriately. Faced with
a distributional shock, the central bank should lower the interbank rate to facilitate the
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reallocation of liquid assets between banks in the interbank market. However, in order to
provide incentives for banks to hold enough liquid assets ex ante, the central bank must
make sure that interbank rates are high enough when the distributional shock does not
occur.
On the other hand, the central bank should respond to aggregate shocks with a policy
of injecting liquid assets in the economy. The goal of this policy is twofold. First, it
helps achieve the optimal distribution of consumption between patient and impatient
depositors. Second, it sets the amount of liquid assets in the interbank market at the
level at which the central bank can adjust the interbank rate to address the suboptimal
distribution of liquidity among banks. Hence, the liquidity injection policy required in
the face of aggregate shocks complements the interest rate policy that is optimal in the
face of distributional shocks.
Our model also shows that a failure to implement the optimal interest rate policy can
lead to bank runs. When the interbank market rate is not set appropriately, a distrib-
utional shock creates consumption risk for patient depositors. If the rate is high, banks
that need to borrow in the interbank market will be left with few goods for their patient
depositors. For some parameter values, and if the rate is high enough, the goods available
to patient depositors will yield less consumption than the amount promised to impatient
depositors. This will create a run as all patient depositors will have an incentive to claim
to be impatient. Even without considering risky long-term assets and counterparty risk,
we show how liquidity shocks can create banking fragility under suboptimal interest rate
policy. Our model provides an important framework for future research that incorporates
credit risk with liquidity risk to examine the impact of central bank rate policy on longer
term interbank interest rates.
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8 Appendix: Generalization to N states
Consider a generalization of the baseline model (without runs or liquidation of long-term
assets) with N distributional-shock states i1; :::; iN  0. We assume i1 = 0; inH = +in";
and inL =   in"; where in 2 fi1; :::; iNg. The probability of in is n,
PN
n=1 n = 1.









(1  inH)u(cinH2 ) + 12(1  
inL)u(cinL2 )]
s.t. injc1  1  + inj + f inj
(1  inj)cinj2  r   inj   f injin
for in 2 fi1; :::; iNg; j 2 J :































By the same logic as in the case with two states, the interest rate in the interbank




whenever in > 0 in order to facilitate risk sharing between








1  for all n  2. Let  =
PN
n=2 in, and then we can write interest rate
i1 as







which is equal to 0 = 0

in the two-state baseline model.7
7We can show that if there is no state with a zero-size shock, then a rst best equilibrium does not exist




for at least one distributional-shock state i;
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